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1
Abstract
International children’s rights law is utterly clear. The use of deprivation of liberty
of children must be limited to the absolute minimum. If it is nevertheless regarded
necessary to arrest, detain, imprison, or institutionalize a child, states have the
obligation to safeguard that her or his rights are recognized and adequately
protected, regardless of the context in which the deprivation of liberty takes
place. This chapter elaborates on the specifics of these two limbs of Article 37
CRC, the core human rights provision for the protection of children deprived of
liberty. It analyzes the legal status these children are entitled to, specifies the
corresponding negative and positive obligations for states, and explores avenues
for an effective implementation.
1 Introduction
The core provision of international children’s rights law concerning deprivation of
liberty of children is Article 37 of the United Nations (UN) Convention on the Rights
of the Child (CRC). This legally binding provision recognizes the impact of depri-
vation of liberty on children and consequently provides – in para. (b) – that children
shall only be arrested, detained, or imprisoned as “a measure of last resort and for the
shortest appropriate period of time”. In addition, Art. 37(c) CRC stipulates that
children who are deprived of their fundamental right to personal liberty must be
treated with humanity and respect for the inherent dignity of the human person, and
in a manner that takes into account the needs of persons of their age. This essentially
revolves around the recognition that each child deprived of his1 liberty remains
entitled to all rights under international human rights law, including the CRC, and
that states parties are bound to protect these rights and to enable children to enjoy
their rights effectively (Liefaard 2008).
International children’s rights law aims to protect children deprived of their
liberty because of the impact of deprivation of liberty on children’s rights and their
short- and long-term interests (UN Human Rights Council 2015, para. 16). Overall,
these children are placed in institutions lacking transparency, which challenges
oversight by family members and society and which makes the child specifically
dependent upon the institution’s regime. Deprivation of liberty puts children in a
particularly vulnerable position. Children deprived of liberty are often confronted
with denial or (gross) violations of their rights including inadequate protection
against violence and ill-treatment, lack of adequate services essential for their
well-being and development, such as sanitation, nutrition, health care, and educa-
tion, and lack of family contact (Meuwese 2003; Cappelaere et al. 2005; UN General
Assembly 2006; Hamilton et al. 2011; UN Human Rights Council 2012, 2015;
Human Rights Watch 2016a, b; Center for Human Rights and Humanitarian Law
2017; see also Liefaard et al. 2014). Moreover, the (over-)use of deprivation of
1unless stated otherwise, “he” also refers to “she”.
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liberty with regard to children is widespread and relates to different systems, such as
the juvenile justice system, child protection system, (mental) health systems, and
immigration system. Many children “languish in pre-trial detention for months or
even years” (CRC Committee 2007b, para. 80), are held in immigration detention for
inappropriate reasons (FRA 2017, p. 45) or are subjected to forms of administrative
detention, without the necessary safeguards, such as judicial oversight, or without a
clear legal or even unlawful basis (see, e.g., Hamilton et al. 2011). Children deprived
of their liberty often belong to the most stigmatized groups in society, including
children in conflict with the law, children in need of care, immigrant children, street
children, children with (mental) health problems, drug addicted children, children
with disabilities, children allegedly involved in radical groups or terrorist activities,
etc. (Liefaard 2008).
These sombre realities could give reason to advocate for the abolition of depri-
vation of liberty altogether (Goldson 2005). Goldson and Kilkelly (2013) point at the
“manifest tension” between human rights and deprivation of their liberty of children
in practice. They underscore the potential of the human rights paradigm, but
ultimately advocate for the abolition of deprivation of liberty because of the practical
limitations of human rights and the ineffectiveness of “rights-based approaches” in
this specific context. From an international legal perspective, however, it is impor-
tant to acknowledge that deprivation of liberty is not and will not be prohibited. Such
a prohibition would simply not be acceptable for states, across the globe. The
international community did nevertheless agree that children are a specific group
of human beings, in need of special protection when deprivation of liberty is
considered and subsequently used. This explains why international children’s rights
law provides strict(er) rules regarding deprivation of liberty of children; rules that are
meant to offer a higher level of protection for children compared to adults.
This chapter addresses the implications of international children’s rights law for
deprivation of liberty of children. As described in the following paragraph, depri-
vation of liberty is used in different ways and in different (legal) contexts. This
chapter takes a broad approach and is not limited to certain forms of deprivation of
liberty. Unless stated otherwise, it aims to reach out to all forms. The chapter
elaborates on the main implications of Art. 37 (b) CRC’s requirement of lawfulness
with a particular focus on the principles of last resort and shortest appropriate period
of time (para. 3). Paragraph 4 subsequently addresses the legal status of children
while being deprived of liberty and identifies its three components: basic rights,
special protection rights, and reintegration rights. Special attention will be given to
access to justice for children deprived of their liberty (para. 5). The chapter con-
cludes with some key observations, also in light of the UN Global Study on
Deprivation of Liberty of Children2 (para. 6).
2This study has been commissioned by the UN Secretary-General on the basis of a resolution of the
UN General Assembly (UN General Assembly 2015. The study aims to get a better understanding
of the number of children affected by deprivation of liberty across the world as well as of the
conditions under which children are deprived of their liberty; it is led by independent expert
Manfred Nowak.
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2 Deprivation of Liberty of Children
2.1 Different Forms and Contexts
Children are deprived of their liberty in many different ways, for different reasons and
in different (legal) contexts. Deprivation of liberty includes arrest, detention, or impris-
onment in the context of criminal justice and placement in child protection or child
welfare institutions meant to protect children by offering a form of alternative care. It
could also take the form of placement in psychiatric institutions, wards, or hospitals for
children with mental health issues and drug rehabilitation centers and institutions for
children with disabilities. Placement in reception or deportation centers in the context of
(im)migration and detention for (other) administrative, security, or military purposes
can also result in the child’s deprivation of liberty (Van Keirsbilck et al. 2016, p. 23ff;
Hamilton et al. 2011; see also Inter-American Commission on Human Rights 2011).
The (legal) context of these forms of deprivation of liberty differs, so do the reasons
and/or justifications for their usage. For the determination of the applicability of specific
children’s rights provisions and related international instruments, the context matters.
However, above all, these forms of institutionalization have one thing in common, that
is, they amount to deprivation of the child’s liberty.
2.2 Defining Deprivation of Liberty
Deprivation of liberty is a limitation of everyone’s right to liberty of the person (Art.
9 (1) International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR); see also Art. 3 of
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Art. 5 (1) European Convention on
Human Rights (ECHR), Art. 7 (1) American Convention on Human Rights (ACHR),
and Art. 6 African (Banjul) Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights). Children have
this right as well. Even though Art. 37 (b) CRC is not as explicit as Art. 9 (1) ICCPR
in recognizing the right to personal liberty, it is meant to protect this right. Moreover,
children are considered to be protected by the relevant provisions in general human
rights instruments (HRC 2014, para. 3; see also Nielsen v. Denmark, para. 58).
The CRC does not provide a definition of deprivation of liberty; nor do the
general human rights treaties at the international and regional level. A definition
can be found in rule 11(b) of the UN Rules for the Protection of Juveniles Deprived
of their Liberty (Havana Rules), which defines deprivation of liberty as “any form of
detention or imprisonment or the placement of a person in a public or private
custodial setting, from which this person is not permitted to leave at will, by order
of any judicial, administrative or other public authority”.3 Under this definition,
3Similar definitions were later incorporated in the Optional Protocol to the UN Convention against
Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (OPCAT, Art. 4(2)) and
the European Rules for Juvenile Offenders Subject to Sanctions Or Measures (Council of Europe
2009, rule 21.5.
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placements in (semi-)open institutions from which children are not allowed to leave
can also amount to deprivation of liberty as protected under Art. 37 CRC. This broad
approach finds support in the position taken by the Human Rights Committee and in
the case law of the European Court of Human Rights.4
According to the HumanRights Committee, “[d]eprivation of liberty involves more
severe restriction of motion within a narrower space than mere interference with
liberty of movement” (HRC 2014, para. 5). Examples of deprivation of liberty include
according to the committee “police custody, arraigo, remand detention, imprisonment
after conviction, house arrest, administrative detention, involuntary hospitalization,
institutional custody of children and confinement to a restricted area of an airport, as
well as being involuntarily transported” (Ibid.). The Human Rights Committee under-
scores that deprivation of liberty is without free consent. Whether this implies that
children can also consent to deprivation of liberty, rendering them without protection
under the ICCPR, remains unclear. Normal supervision of children by parents or
family, however, may involve a degree of control over movement, especially of
younger children, that would be inappropriate for adults, but that does not constitute
a deprivation of liberty; neither do ordinary requirements of daily school attendance
constitute a deprivation of liberty” (HRC 2014, para. 62, footnote 176). This in
contrast to placement of a child in institutional care, which may be required by his
or her best interests and amounts to deprivation of liberty (Ibid, para. 62).
The Human Rights Committee, thus, acknowledges that there is a gradual
difference between deprivation of liberty and limitation of liberty of movement,
and that the individual does not consent. Or as Nowak observes, “An interference
with personal liberty results only from the forceful detention (emphasis added) of a
person at a certain narrowly bounded location (emphasis added). . .”; “[a]ll less
grievous restrictions on freedom of bodily movement (. . .) do not fall within the
scope of the right to personal liberty but instead under the freedom of movement”
(Nowak 2005, p. 212).
The European Court of Human Rights has taken a similar approach under Art. 5
(1) ECHR and ruled that the distinction between deprivation of liberty and limitation
of movement is “merely one of degree or intensity, and not one of nature or
substance” (Guzzardi v. Italy (1980), para. 93; Ashingdane v. UK (1985), para. 41;
4See also Inter-American Commission of Human Rights which defines deprivation of liberty in a
similar way as “[a]ny form of detention, imprisonment, institutionalization, or custody of a person
in a public or private institution which that person is not permitted to leave at will, by order of or
under de facto control of a judicial, administrative or any other authority, for reasons of humani-
tarian assistance, treatment, guardianship, protection, or because of crimes or legal offenses” (Inter-
American Commission on Human Rights 2011, para. 38). According to the Commission, “[t]his
category of persons includes not only those deprived of their liberty because of crimes or infringe-
ments or non compliance with the law, whether they are accused or convicted, but also those
persons who are under the custody and supervision of certain institutions, such as: psychiatric
hospitals and other establishments for persons with physical, mental, or sensory disabilities;
institutions for children and the elderly; centers for migrants, refugees, asylum or refugee status
seekers, stateless and undocumented persons; and any other similar institution the purpose of which
is to deprive persons of their liberty” (Ibid.).
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H.L. v. UK (2004), para. 89; Rantsev v. Cyprus and Russia (2010), para. 314; Stanev
v. Bulgaria [GC] (2012), para. 115; De Tommaso v. Italy [GC] (2017), para. 80).5
The Court considers that deprivation of liberty comprises an objective and a subjec-
tive element (Storck v. Germany (2005), para. 74; Stanev v. Bulgaria [GC] (2012),
para. 117). The objective element is that a person is confined “in a particular
restricted space for a not negligible length of time” (Storck v. Germany 2005,
para. 74). However, the case law of the ECtHR makes clear that deprivation of
liberty is not limited to placement in closed institutions or the “classic detention in
prison or strict arrest” (Guzzardi v. Italy, para. 95) and “it is not determinative
whether the ward was ‘locked’ or ‘lockable’” (H.L. v. UK (2004), para. 92). Open
institutions can also fall under the protection of Art. 5 (1) ECHR (Bouamar v.
Belgium (1988)), and placement in an open department of a psychiatric hospital
can constitute deprivation of liberty despite the fact that the individual concerned is
allowed to leave the hospital without supervision (Ashingdane v. UK (1985), para.
42). The European Court assesses the specific context in which a placement takes
place and circumstances under which it is enforced. A range of different criteria is
relevant in this regard including “the type, duration, effects and manner of imple-
mentation of the measure in question” (Guzzardi v. Italy (1980), para. 92;
Medvedyev and Others v. France [GC] (2010), para. 73; Creangă v. Romania
[GC] (2012), para. 91; see also Engel et al. v. The Netherlands (1976), paras.
58–59). Other relevant factors include the possibility to leave the restricted area,
the degree of supervision and control over the individual’s movements (H.L. v.
United Kingdom (2004), para. 91), the extent of isolation, and the availability of
social contacts (family, other detainees, and staff; Guzzardi v. Italy (1980), para. 95;
H.M. v. Switzerland (2002), para. 45; Storck v. Germany (2005), para. 73).
The case law of the European Court is not very child-specific as far as the
objective element of deprivation of liberty is concerned. “Age”, for example, has
not been explicitly mentioned as a relevant factor. A lower threshold for children
with regard to the assumption that a certain placement amounts to deprivation of
liberty can, however, be defended. This would be in line with Art. 24 of the ICCPR
and the position of the Human Rights Committee calling for the adoption of a higher
degree of protection for children in this context (HRC 2014, para. 62); a position that
can also be assumed to underlie Art. 37 (b) CRC (Liefaard 2008).
Minority has, however, played a role in the case law of the European Court with
regard to the subjective element of deprivation of liberty, which concerns a person’s
consent to the placement. According to the Court, “[a] person can only be considered
to have been deprived of his liberty if, as an additional subjective element, he has not
validly consented to the confinement” (Storck v. Germany (2005), para. 74; see also
H.M. v. Switzerland (2002), para. 46). The significance of this subjective element
5Examples of limitations of movement (under Art. 2 of the Fourth Protocol to the ECHR) include
the curfew, the duty to report to the police and inform the police about whereabouts, restraining
orders or instruction to refrain from certain behavior (Trechsel 2005, p. 413; see also De Tommaso
v. Italy [GC] (2017) and Human Rights Committee, 2014. Cf. EU Court of Justice, 28 July 2016,
C-294/16 PPU.
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has been limited by the Court’s ruling that “the right to liberty is too important in a
democratic society for a person to lose the benefit of Convention protection for the
single reason that he may have given himself up to be taken into detention” (H.L. v.
UK (2004), para. 90; Stanev v. Bulgaria [GC] (2012), para. 119; see also De Wilde,
Ooms and Versyp v. Belgium (1971), para. 65). This is particularly true “when it is
not disputed that the person is legally incapable of consenting to, or disagreeing
with, the proposed action” (Storck v. Germany 2005, para. 75; H.L. v. UK 2004,
para. 90). The European Court therefore seems to assume that children (i.e., indi-
viduals that have not attained the age of majority, Storck v. Germany (2005), para.
75) cannot be considered to have the capacity to consent or object to the placement
(see a contrario Storck v. Germany (2005), para. 75) and should be granted
protection under Art. 5 ECHR. This position by the Court does not only offer a
higher level of protection to children, as category of human beings, it also seems to
have set aside the Court’s earlier ruling that a child’s placement by his parent (i.e.,
legal representative) does not amount to deprivation of liberty (Nielsen v. Denmark
(1988)); a position which has met with considerable criticism for its lack of sensi-
tivity to children’s rights (Van Bueren 1995, p. 212ff; Kilkelly 1999, p. 35ff;
Trechsel 2005, p. 415; Murdoch 2006, p. 314ff).
In conclusion, the definition of the Havana Rules, which is broad and refers to all
placements in institutions from which a child is not permitted to leave at will,
represents the international standard. It recognizes that children require an adequate
and higher level of protection, which starts by acknowledging that many of the
widely practiced forms of institutional placement of children amount to deprivation
of liberty. And that, as a consequence, the children concerned are entitled to be fully
protected under international human rights law, which has many child-specific
implications. These implications will be addressed in the following paragraphs.
3 Requirements for Deprivation of Liberty
3.1 CRC Framework: Last Resort and Shortest Appropriate Period
of Time
Art. 37 (b) CRC prohibits unlawful and arbitrary deprivation of liberty6 and it provides
that “[t]he arrest, detention or imprisonment of a child shall be in conformity with the
law and shall be used only as a measure of last resort and for the shortest appropriate
period of time”. The introduction of the requirements of last resort and the shortest
appropriate period of time has been characterized as one “among the most notable
improvements and innovations which the [CRC] sets out” (Cantwell 1992, pp. 28–29).
6The prohibition of unlawful and arbitrary deprivation of liberty can be found in the general
international and regional human rights treaties; see Art. 9 (1) ICCPR, Art. 7 (2) and (3) ACHR,
Art. 6 Banjul Charter, and Art. 5 (1) ECHR. The prohibition of arbitrariness cannot be found
explicitly in Art. 5 ECHR but is implied; see Trechsel 2005. Art. 37 (b) CRC has been based on Art.
9 (1) ICCPR; Detrick 1999, p. 629.
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The requirement of last resort can be found in general human rights provisions
preceding the CRC. Art. 9 ICCPR, for example, stipulates that pretrial detention
must not be used as a “general rule” (para. 3). Art. 5(1) ECHR provides an exhaustive
list of justified reasons for the use of “detention,” and the European Court has ruled in
favor of release in numerous cases (see, e.g., Smirnova v. Russia, paras. 58–59, which
relates to pre-trial detention). The CRC, however, is the only human rights treaty that
explicitly acknowledges both requirements as part of the general requirements of
lawfulness and non-arbitrariness (Schabas and Sax 2006, p. 78). It can be argued
that the CRC provides a higher standard, not only because it is more explicit and
further substantiates the requirement of legality of deprivation of liberty, but also
because it reaches out to “arrest, detention and imprisonment” and is therefore not
limited to pre-trial detention (Van Bueren 1995, p. 210). In fact, the CRC reaches out
to all forms of deprivation of liberty, which requires some further elaboration.
3.2 Art. 37 (b) CRC: Not Limited to Juvenile Justice
The scope of Art. 37 (b) CRC has been subject to debate (Van Bueren 1995; Schabas
and Sax 2006; Liefaard 2008). This provision’s second sentence refers to “arrest,
detention and imprisonment”, despite the broader reference to deprivation of liberty
in the first sentence, as well as in Art. 37 (c) and (d) CRC. During the drafting, the
wording of Art. 37 (b) CRC was deliberately changed with the aim to limit the scope
of the last resort and shortest appropriate period of time requirements to the context
of juvenile justice (Detrick 1992, p. 477). Some countries were not willing to limit
their discretion regarding forms of deprivation of liberty outside the scope of
juvenile justice. Consequently, one could argue, on the basis of the drafting history,
that the last resort and shortest appropriate period of time requirements only apply to
juvenile justice cases (Van Bueren 1995, p. 209 and 214).
However, such a restrictive interpretation can be questioned. Only one year later,
the Havana Rules were adopted, and this instrument represents a broad approach
with a definition of deprivation of liberty that is not limited to juvenile justice (see
para. 2). In addition, rule 2 of the Havana Rules provides that deprivation of liberty
should be a “disposition of last resort and for minimum necessary period and should
be limited to exceptional cases”. According to Schabas and Sax, the approach of the
Havana Rules forms part of “the trend towards the emancipation of deprivation of
liberty standards from the narrower criminal law context to a broader scope of
applicability” (Schabas and Sax 2006, p. 55), and with the Havana Rules, the
international community deliberately chose to “overcome the traditional narrow
perception of deprivation of liberty as a criminal justice issue only” (Ibid., p. 84).
Indeed, a restrictive approach would result in a major inconsistency within Art. 37
CRC. It would also be difficult to reconcile it with the context and purpose of the
CRC, specific CRC provisions, such as Art. 20 (3) CRC, and related instruments
relevant for children deprived of liberty (Ibid, p. 85). Furthermore, it can be argued
that the prohibition of discrimination (Art. 2 CRC) stands in the way of a strict
interpretation of Art. 37(b) CRC.
8 T. Liefaard
More than a quarter of a century later, the protection of children deprived of liberty
has clearly moved beyond the context of juvenile justice. The UN Committee on the
Rights of the Child (CRC Committee) has expressed its concern regarding the lack of
implementation of the requirements of last resort and/or shortest appropriate period of
time in different contexts and routinely recommended states parties to implement the
Havana Rules (see, e.g., CRC Committee 2012, para. 56(a), 2016b, para. 53(d), 2014,
para. 37, 39(a) (g), 2016a, para. 60–61, 2015, para. 55(a). The Committee refers to
both requirements in its General Comment No. 6 on the treatment of unaccompanied
and separated children outside their country of origin (CRC Committee 2005, para.
61). In relation to alternative care, the CRC Committee took a similar approach by
underscoring that institutionalization, which may very well include forms of depriva-
tion of liberty, must be a last resort (CRC Committee 2003a, para. 35; see also CRC
Committee 2017a, para. 45 and Guidelines for the Alternative Care of Children, UN
General Assembly 2010, paras. 23 and 132). Yet, the only General Comment in which
the CRC Committee has comprehensively elaborated on the rights of children
deprived of their liberty is the one on juvenile justice (CRC Committee 2007b).
Regional human right courts and commissions have also developed specific case
law on detention of children that concerns the protection of children deprived of liberty
in different contexts. The point of departure that deprivation of liberty should only be
used if strictly necessary and as short as possible, regardless of its context, is a
common standard in this case law.7 In the context of immigration, it can be argued
that the international community has even moved beyond the standards of Art. 37 (b)
CRC by advocating for the abolition of the use of detention for immigration purposes
(see also Smyth in this book [cross-reference]). And the foreseen Global Study on
Deprivation of Liberty of Children is firmly grounded in the belief that all forms of
deprivation of liberty should be a measure of last resort and be used only for the
shortest appropriate period of time. Thus, it is fair to conclude that the international
community has moved beyond the restrictive approach of the 1980s represented in
Article 37 (b) CRC’s wording. That is not to say that one should not recognize
differences in context when it comes to the implementation of Art. 37 (b) CRC.
3.3 Requirements of Last Resort and Shortest Appropriate Period
of Time
Introduction
The requirements of last resort and shortest appropriate period of time place states
parties under the obligation to use deprivation of liberty regarding children with the
utmost restraint and only after careful consideration, that is: based on an individual
7See, e.g. Blokhin v. Russia [GC] 2016; Bouamar v. Belgium 1988. The Inter-American Commis-
sion and Court have dealt with several cases outside of the criminal justice context, i.e., deprivation
of liberty in airports, military bases, psychiatric hospitals, and orphanages; see Inter-American
Commission on Human Rights 2011.
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assessment regarding the necessity and proportionality of deprivation of liberty,
while taking into account the best interests of the child (Art. 3 (1) CRC; Liefaard
2008, p. 84 with reference to Schabas and Sax 2006, p. 81). The complexity of this
assessment is a given. In essence, the last resort requirement revolves around the
availability and use of alternatives. As far as juvenile justice is concerned, Art. 40 (4)
CRC provides that “[a] variety of dispositions, such as care, guidance and supervi-
sion orders; counselling; probation; foster care; education and vocational training
programmes and other alternatives to institutional care shall be available to ensure
that children are dealt with in a manner appropriate to their well-being and propor-
tionate both to their circumstances and the offence.”8 The appropriateness of depri-
vation of liberty requires an answer to the question of why its use is appropriate in
light of the interests of the individual child and the circumstances of the case, which
include the interests of others or the society as a whole. Art. 37 (b) CRC rules out the
use of mandatory detention (Schabas and Sax 2006, p. 82). Minimum sentences can
be challenged under this provision as well. The South African Constitutional Court
has declared legislation imposing minimum sentences for 16- and 17-year-olds
unconstitutional, since it implied the use of imprisonment as a first and only resort.9
This not only violated Article 28(1)(g) of the South African Constitution, providing
that detention of children should be a measure of last resort and used only for the
shortest appropriate period of time, it also did not allow for individualized sentences,
potentially resulting in a lower or non-custodial sentence. The Court explicitly
referred to Article 37 (b) CRC and related UN resolutions. It quoted rule 17 (1) (a)
of the Beijing Rules calling for sentences that are “in proportion to the circumstances
and gravity of the offence” and to “the circumstances and needs of the juvenile as
well as the needs of society.” According to Skelton, the Court identified four
principles that follow from international law and should be taken into account
when considering the use of deprivation of liberty: “proportionality; imprisonment
is a measure of last resort and for the shortest appropriate period of time; children
must be treated differently from adults; and the well-being of the child is the central
consideration” (Skelton 2015, p. 27). These principles result in a tailor-made approach,
different in each individual case. The Court also made clear that the requirement of last
resort means that if there is another appropriate option, it should be favored. If no other
option can be considered appropriate, the duration of the imprisonment should be
mitigated because of the fact that a child is concerned (para. 31).
The reasoning of the South African Constitutional Court underscores that chil-
dren should be approached differently when it comes to the use of deprivation of
liberty. This applies to other contexts as well (i.e., outside the context of juvenile
justice), but requires that the application of deprivation of liberty is the result of a
8This list makes clear that alternatives could also be made available outside of the context of the
juvenile justice system, e.g., through diversion to the child welfare system.
9Centre for Child Law v Minister for Justice and Constitutional Development and Others (CCT98/
08) [2009] ZACC 18, para. 43 and. 9; see also para. 31.
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specific and child-focused decision-making process that is firmly grounded in
domestic law.10
Last Resort
Last resort presupposes that deprivation of liberty can only be used if other resorts
are not considered appropriate or have proven to be inappropriate. This assumes that
the objectives of the deprivation of liberty are clear. Both the objectives and the
alternatives will be largely defined by the specifics of the context in which the
deprivation of liberty takes place. For example, in the context of juvenile justice, it
is important to differentiate between arrest, police custody, pre-trial detention, and
forms of deprivation of liberty after conviction. These forms of deprivation of liberty
serve different objectives, and the implementation of the last resort requirement
requires that these objectives are given due consideration (see, e.g., Van den Brink
2018 on pre-trial detention). In the child protection system, deprivation of liberty
may serve as a form of alternative care, but should be used only if family- or
community-based alternatives, such as foster care or kafalah, are not appropriate
(see Art. 20 (3) CRC). Article 5 (1)(d) ECHR allows for the use of detention for
“educational supervision” of minors, but this means that the deprivation of liberty
should result in placement in an institution that is designed and provided with
sufficient resources for this purpose (Bouamar v. Belgium (1988), para. 50; see
also D.G. v Ireland (2002) and Blokhin v Russia [GC] (2016)). Within the context of
(im)migration, there are different forms of deprivation of liberty serving different
purposes, such as immigration control or deportation; also the objective of protection
of children is used in this context (see, e.g., Hamilton et al. 2011). The necessity and
appropriateness of these forms of detention for children have increasingly been
questioned. The CRC Committee has stated that unaccompanied and separated
children should not be deprived of their liberty and that “[d]etention cannot be
justified solely on the basis of the child being unaccompanied or separated, or on
their migratory or residence status or lack thereof” (CRC Committee 2005, para. 61).
The CRC Committee and the Committee on the Protection of the Rights of All
Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families have furthermore taken the firm
position that children should not be deprived of liberty based on their or their
parents’ migration status. The committees observe that “the possibility of detaining
children as a measure of last resort, which may apply in other contexts such as
juvenile criminal justice, is not applicable in immigration proceedings as it would
conflict with the principle of the best interests of the child and the right to develop-
ment” (CRC Committee 2017b, para. 10). As a consequence, they argue that “child
and family immigration detention should be prohibited by law and its abolishment
ensured in policy and practice” and that “[r]esources dedicated to detention should
10It is interesting to point at the developments regarding life imprisonment (without parole) in the
USAwhere there is a clear movement toward recognizing that the use of imprisonment with regard
to children should be based on an individualized sentence, while recognizing that children are
different from adults; see, e.g., Kilkelly 2016; Scott et al. 2016.
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be diverted to non-custodial solutions carried out by competent child protection
actors engaging with the child and, where applicable, his or her family” (CRC
Committee 2017b, para. 12). This firm position can count on the support (see, e.g.,
UN Human Rights Council 2015; see also Smyth in this book). One could indeed
question whether deprivation of liberty is in the best interests of the child. However,
neither the CRC nor the other standards of international human rights law prohibit
immigration detention (see also FRA 2017, p. 30–31).
Shortest Appropriate Period of Time
The implications of the requirement of the shortest appropriate period of time are
somewhat unclear. The word “appropriate” was included in the final stages of the
drafting and replaced “possible” (Van Bueren 1995, p. 214). It reflects – again – the
need for a tailor-made decision in which the best interest of the child is a primary
consideration (Art. 3 (1) CRC). In the context of alternative care, “appropriate”
refers to the best interests of the child considerations that justify the separation of the
child from his parents or family and subsequent institutionalization (Art. 9 (1) in
conjunction with 20 (1) CRC). In addition, the placement should be appropriate for
the “continuity in a child’s upbringing” (Art. 20 (3) CRC). In the context of juvenile
justice, appropriateness should be understood in light of the objectives of juvenile
justice as laid down in Art. 40 (1) CRC. This means that the duration of deprivation
of liberty should be conducive to the child’s reintegration. At the same time,
“appropriate” is not necessarily the shortest period of time. One could, for example,
defend a longer deprivation of liberty if this is considered necessary for the protec-
tion of the child’s best interests and harmonious development. It needs no explana-
tion that this can be a slippery slope. It can be defended, however, that states parties
are compelled to limit the duration of deprivation of liberty as much as possible and
that appropriateness should also be understood in the light of the impact of depri-
vation of liberty on children, including the level of security. In particular with regard
to the use of pretrial detention, this finds support in the Beijing Rules (rule 13.1) and
the Havana Rules (rule 17) as well as in case law from the European Court of Human
Rights in which the Court consistently refers to the shortest possible period of time
with regard to pretrial detention (Nart v. Turkey (2008); Guvec v. Turkey (2009)).
The requirement of the shortest appropriate period of time could also call for the use
of a trajectory in which a child is transferred from a closed institution to a (semi-)
open institution as soon as possible.
Severe Sentences
The CRC is confusing with regard to the use of deprivation of liberty as a disposition
(i.e., in the context of juvenile justice). Art. 37 (a) CRC allows for the use of life
imprisonment, provided that there is a “possibility of release”. The inclusion of this
provision is the result of compromise during the drafting (Detrick 1992, p. 475). It is
clearly one of the weakest links of the CRC. Understanding it in light of Art. 37 (b)
CRC is difficult and points at a major inconsistency within Art. 37 CRC. The CRC
Committee has also observed that “a life imprisonment of a child will make it very
difficult, if not impossible, to achieve the aims of juvenile justice despite the
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possibility of release” and consequently recommends to “abolish all forms of life
imprisonment for offences committed by persons under the age of 18” (CRC
Committee 2007b, para. 77). The CRC Committee also underscores that sentences
resulting in deprivation of liberty for a longer period of time must be subjected to
periodic review (CRC Committee 2007b, para. 77). The position has also been
embraced by the European Union in the Directive on procedural safeguards for
children who are suspects or accused persons in criminal proceedings that calls for
periodic review of all forms of detention by a court (Art. 10 (2) Directive (EU) 2016/
800 (Official Journal of the European Union 2016).
Procedural Safeguards
The requirements of last resort and shortest appropriate period of time substantiate
the overarching requirement of legality, which encompasses lawfulness and non-
arbitrariness (see further Liefaard 2008, p. 174–184) and which can be challenged by
the child before “a court or other competent, independent and impartial authority”
(Art. 37(d) CRC). This right to habeas corpus also relates to the legality of continued
deprivation of liberty. A form of deprivation of liberty may be justified in the
beginning, but this may change over time. Under Art. 5 ECHR, the right to habeas
corpus has played a key role in the assessment of prolonged or continued pre-trial
detention. Pre-trial detention can only be continued if there are relevant and suffi-
cient reasons to do so, and the threshold for this increases over time (see, e.g.,
McKay v. UK [GC] (2006), para. 45). Similarly, it can be argued that the inclusion of
the requirement of the shortest appropriate period of time in Art. 37 (b) CRC
provides a particular legal basis to challenge the legality of the deprivation of liberty
over time and essentially calls for periodic review. In light of this, the CRC
Committee recommends states parties to set fixed time limits (1) for the duration
of pretrial detention and (2) for its judicial review, that is: preferably every 2 weeks
(CRC Committee 2007b, para. 83). If deprivation of liberty takes place in the context
of alternative care, the legal basis for periodic review can be found in Art. 25 CRC.
Some Concluding Observations
While the requirements of last resort and shortest appropriate period of time steer at
the prevention of deprivation of liberty of children as much as possible, their
implementation remains a problematic and complex issue. Reality shows that its
implementation leaves much to be desired (see, e.g., Kilkelly 2017, p. 43ff; see also
para. 1). This is in part related to the lack of specific guidance from both international
standards and monitoring mechanisms at the international level on the implementa-
tion of these requirements. Other factors relate to lack of legal incentives, in
domestic law, to use alternatives or deprivation of liberty only for a short period of
time and to provide timely judicial reviews and the availability of alternatives and
(financial and human) resources (or lack thereof) to effectively implement alterna-
tives. The lack of awareness among legislators, policymakers, and professionals
around the significance of these requirements and knowledge on how to prevent the
use of deprivation of liberty is another issue of concern. Regarding the latter, it is
important to recognize that social norms and perceptions, in general, but also, for
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example, among professionals involved in the decision-making regarding depriva-
tion of liberty may stand in in the way of implementation (see, e.g., CRC Committee
2007b, paras. 96 and 97). This all means that effective strategies related to depriva-
tion of liberty as a last resort and for the shortest appropriate period of time require
different kinds of action, at the same time. This action should particularly focus on:
1. the inclusion of strict norms for the use of deprivation of liberty in domestic
statutory legislation, including grounds for deprivation of liberty, time limits, the
obligation to explicitly consider alternatives, and procedural safeguards, includ-
ing periodic judicial review; one could also consider the establishment of a
minimum age for deprivation of liberty (see rule 11(a) Havana Rules);
2. the creation and availability of adequate alternatives, outside or within the legal
system in question (see, e.g., Sampson et al. 2015; Kilkelly et al. 2016);
3. the education and training of decision-makers, which should include addressing
existing perceptions.
Only then and only with support of international, regional, and national monitor-
ing bodies, one could expect that something will change.
4 Legal Status of Children Deprived of Their Liberty: Rights
and State Obligations
4.1 General Approach Towards Children Deprived of Liberty
Article 37 (c) CRC provides that if a child is deprived of his liberty, he “shall be
treated with humanity and respect for the inherent dignity of the human person, and
in a manner that takes into account the needs of person of his or her age”. This
reflects the general human rights approach toward individuals deprived of their
liberty, which assumes that each individual who is deprived of liberty remains
entitled to all rights and freedoms under international human rights law (Liefaard
2008). Specifically with regard to children, Article 37 (c) CRC recognizes that each
child deprived of liberty is entitled to be treated in a child-specific manner. This in
essence boils down to treatment that is sensitive to children, and it places states
parties under the obligation to establish special institutions for children (CRC
Committee 2007b, paras. 85 and 89). Hence, Article 37 (c) CRC explicitly requires
that children must be separated from adults, unless it is considered in the best interest
of the child not to do so (cf. Art. 10 (2)(b) and (3) ICCPR). It also recognizes the
right of the child to maintain contact with his family through correspondence and
visits, save in exceptional circumstances, which essentially refers to the best interests
of child as well (Van Bueren 1995, p. 220).
Treatment in accordance with Article 37 (c) CRC furthermore means that it takes
into account the needs and interests of the individual child. This implies, also in
conjunction with Article 3 (1) CRC, that the best interests of each child should be
considered in relation to the child’s placement and during his stay in the institution,
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which calls for individualized approach. It also means that differences among
children ought to be recognized and considered. Differences among children not
only relate to age and maturity but also to gender, cultural, religious, and personal
beliefs, ethnic background, status and health, including mental capacity, among
others. Such differences should be taken into account when accommodating chil-
dren, when providing basic services including education, (mental) health care, and
means to manifest religion or beliefs, or when reintegrating children. Children
deprived of their liberty should, in other words, not be regarded as a homogenous
group, and institutions must accommodate differences among children through
differentiation. According to rule 28 Havana Rules, “[t]he principle criterion for
the separation of different categories of juveniles deprived of their liberty should be
the provision of the type of care best suited to the particular needs of the individuals
concerned and the protection of their physical, mental and more integrity and well-
being”. In connection with this, children should have access to means to question
and/or challenge their placement and request for alternative placement (see further
below).
Despite the differences among children deprived of liberty, it should be acknowl-
edged that all children are entitled to be treated equally and to be protected against
discrimination (Art. 2 CRC; Liefaard 2008, p. 228; Schabas and Sax 2006, p. 89).
The right to be treated with humanity and with respect for the inherent dignity of the
human person, supplemented by the right to be treated in a child-specific manner,
implies that states parties are under the obligation to safeguard each child deprived of
his liberty a legal status acknowledging:
1. that the child remains entitled to all rights under international human rights law,
including the CRC;
2. that the enjoyment of rights can only be limited if strictly required by the
objectives of the child’s condition (i.e., deprivation of liberty) and only while
respecting the general principles of the CRC, in particular the best interests of the
child (Art. 3 (1) CRC) and the child’s rights to be heard (Art. 12 CRC);
3. that the child has the right to an effective remedy against unlawful or arbitrary
treatment (Liefaard 2015, p. 254; see also Liefaard 2008, pp. 225–226).
This children’s rights approach has implications for many aspects of the depri-
vation of liberty. Detailed guidance is provided by the Havana Rules and its
international and regional equivalents: the Nelson Mandela Rules, the standards of
the Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment (CPT 24th General Report [CPT/Inf (2015) 1]; hereinafter: CPT stan-
dards), the Council of Europe’s 2008 European rules for juvenile offenders subject to
sanctions or measures (hereinafter: European rules for juvenile offenders or Euro-
pean rules), and the 2010 Guidelines on child-friendly justice. These instruments
provide a substantial body of substantive and procedural rules concerning children
deprived of their liberty. Many of these rules are relevant for children as they are to
adults, but some are child-specific or call for child-specific implementation.
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In its 10th General Comment, the CRC Committee calls upon states parties to
incorporate the Havana Rules into national laws and regulations and to make them
available to professionals, in the national or regional language (CRC Committee
2007b, para. 88). Despite the focus of this General Comment on children’s rights in
the context of juvenile justice, the committee lists principles and rules that “need to
be observed in all cases of deprivation of liberty” (CRC Committee 2007b, para. 89).
These include rules and principles relating to the physical environment and accom-
modation, education, health, contact with the outside world, the use of restraint or
force, disciplinary measures, inspection and monitoring, and right to make requests
and complaints.
4.2 Rights of Children Deprived of Their Liberty
In concrete terms, the legal status of children deprived of their liberty can be divided
into three components: (1) basic rights, (2) rights to offer special protection, and (3)
rights relevant for the children’s reintegration (Liefaard 2008). These three catego-
ries will be briefly addressed below, followed by a paragraph with a special focus on
the right to access to justice (para. 5). It should be acknowledged that the three
components co-exist, but interrelate at the same time. Basic rights can, for example,
be relevant for the child’s reintegration, and some specific rights, such as the right to
maintain contact with family, can be considered as a cross-cutting right, relevant for
all three components.
Basic Rights
The first component of the legal status of children and corresponding (positive)
obligations of states parties concern basic rights, such as the right to an adequate
standard of living (Art. 27 CRC), to health care (Art. 24 CRC), to education (Art. 28
and 29 CRC), and to leisure and play (Art. 31 CRC). Basic rights have implications
for accommodation, including minimum floor space, fresh air, hygiene and sanita-
tion, food and nutrition, and personal care. The CPT standards, for example, refer to
the need for rooms, which are “appropriately furnished and provide good access to
natural light and adequate ventilation” (CPT Standards, para. 104; see also rule 63.1
European Rules for juvenile offenders referring to “climate conditions and especially
(. . .) floor space, cubic content of air, lighting, heating and ventilation”; see also rule
13 Nelson Mandela Rules). Bad conditions can be on strained terms with children’s
basic rights; they may also amount to degrading or other forms of ill-treatment as
prohibited under Art. 37 (a) CRC.11 The CPT recommends the use of individual
rooms and that shared sleeping accommodation should be justified on the basis of the
best interests and after consultation of the child (Ibid, para. 104). This is a firmer
11It should be noted that the dividing line between violation of Art. 37 (a) and (c) CRC is not very
clear; the same is true for the distinction between Art. 7 and 10(1) ICCPR; Liefaard 2008, p. 596;
Nowak 2005; Schabas and Sax 2006.
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approach than the one that can be found in the Havana Rules, which provides that
sleeping accommodation should “normally consist of small group dormitories or
individual bedrooms,” while taking into account local standards (rule 33 Havana
Rules). The CPT argues that “establishments with large dormitories should be
phased out” because they put “[children] at a significantly higher risk of violence
and exploitation” (CPT Standards, para. 104). The Havana Rules underscore the
need for “regular, unobtrusive” supervision of staff of all accommodation, in partic-
ular sleeping areas and during the night (rule 33 Havana Rules; see also rule 64
European Rules for juvenile offenders).
The right to health care includes medical checks upon admission, general health
care, and dental care (see also CRC Committee 2007b, para. 89). The health of
children deprived of their liberty should be an institution’s main concern, which is
linked to sanitation. Therefore, children are entitled to be accommodated in a way
that respects the child’s “right to facilities and services that meet all the requirements
of health and human dignity” (rule 31 Havana Rules), ideally in small-scale and open
detention facilities (rule 30 Havana Rules). The Havana Rules provide that “[s]
anitary installations should be so located and of sufficient standard to enable every
[child] to comply, as required, with their physical needs in privacy and in a clear and
decent manner”. Other instruments, such as the 2015 Nelson Mandela Rules,
provide more guidance and underscore that accommodation needs to meet the
requirements of health and hygiene. In light of this, the position of girls must be
acknowledged; girls should be provided “with ready access to sanitary and washing
facilities as well as to hygienic items, such as sanitary towels” (CPT Standards, para.
106). Facilities for children should furthermore enable individualized treatment and
should be “integrated into the social, economic and cultural environment of the
community” (rule 30 Havana Rules). This points at the direct link between respect
for basic rights and the reintegration of the child. Sanitation and hygiene are
recognized as essential for the well-being of a child and the protection of a child’s
human dignity.
The rights to education and to leisure and play call for the availability of
education and opportunities to participate in play, leisure, and recreational activities
(see also Blokhin v. Russia [GC] (2016), para. 170). These kinds of activities should
be part of the institution’s daily program, which enables a child to engage with other
children and which prevents isolation that may have a detrimental impact on his
well-being and development. Facilities where children are detained should be safe,
supportive to the reintegration of the child, and take into account “the need of the
[child] for privacy, sensory stimuli, opportunities for association with peers and
participation in sports, physical exercise and leisure-time activities” (rule 32 Havana
Rules).
Basic rights also concern the protection of civil and political rights including
the right to privacy (Art. 16 CRC), right to family life (Art. 16 CRC), and freedom
of religion, thought, and conscience (Art. 14 CRC). The enjoyment of these rights
should be fully respected and cannot be limited unlawfully or arbitrarily. This
has implications for domestic legislation, which should provide the grounds on
which, for example, the child’s privacy can be limited, and under whose authority.
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These rights also come with positive obligations and relate to the availability of
means to enjoy these rights effectively. As far as the right to privacy is concerned,
international standards assume that children should be allowed to use their own
clothing (see rule 36 Havana Rules). The right to family life has been explicitly
acknowledged in Article 37 (c) CRC, which provides for the right of the child to
maintain family contact. This right has many implications, among others related to
information for parents and family on the detention of their child (see also Art. 9 (4)
CRC), the accommodation of the child (i.e., “decentralized”, which facilitates family
contact, rule 30 Havana Rules), and (non-limitation of) visits, also as part of
disciplinary matters (see rule 67 Havana Rules). And the right of child to have his
freedom of religion, thought, and consciences respected also comes with negative
and positive obligations (Art. 14 CRC). First, a child may not be limited in the
exercise of this right without a proper justification. Secondly, a child deprived of his
liberty should be able to pray or attend a service, which assumes and implies the
availability of representatives of different religions and believes (rule 48 Havana
Rules). The freedom of religion also has implications for the food served in the
institution (rule 37 Havana Rules).
Thus, the basic rights of the child deprived of liberty enshrine both negative and
positive obligations for states parties. International and regional standards provide
for detailed guidance, and, according to the CRC Committee, the specifics should be
incorporated in domestic (statutory) law.
Special Protection Rights
Although children’s basic rights also revolve around the protection of children’s
dignity and humanity, there are specific entitlements that aim to protect children’s
fundamental rights and freedoms – the second component of a child’s legal status.
First, the absolute right to be protected against torture and other forms of ill-
treatment has particular relevance for children deprived of their liberty (Art. 37 (a)
CRC). In addition, a child deprived of liberty has the right to be protected against all
forms of violence as laid down in Art. 19 CRC, since placement in an institution
means that that institution becomes responsible for the care and well-being of a child.
It goes beyond the scope of this chapter to elaborate on the implications of both
fundamental rights, but it is clear that these are directly connected to the special
entitlements of children deprived of their liberty. These “special protection rights”
correspond with both negative and positive obligations for states, including obliga-
tions to set up a regulatory framework for the use of disciplinary and protective
measures, screenings measures, and force, to prevent the use of solitary confinement,
to provide each child with information on his legal position, to provide for individual
files and records, and to provide effective remedies and to safeguard independent
oversight (see para 4.3). Some of these rights will be briefly addressed below. The
right to have contact with the family, mentioned earlier as a cross-cutting right, can
also be regarded as offering special protection to children deprived of their liberty.
Family visits and correspondence contribute to the transparency of institution and
the visibility of these children, which essentially serves the protection of their rights
and interests.
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It should be noted that whereas international instruments, such as the Havana
Rules, provide detailed guidance on many substantive rights, less guidance is
provided on the details of the most far-reaching limitations of and infringements
upon rights and freedoms of children. In other words, states seem to have more
discretion when it comes to the regulation of disciplinary measures and the use of
force and screening measures, among others. The same is true with regard to the
monitoring of institutions and access to justice (see further below).
Information and Files
For the enjoyment of rights, it is vital that the child is aware of his rights and
understands how to enjoy these rights (Rap and Liefaard 2017). This presupposes
that a child is fully informed about his rights upon admission. This corresponds with
the duty of the institution to adequately inform a child immediately after he arrives.
Rule 24 Havana Rules provides that a child “shall be given a copy of the rules
governing the detention facility and a written description of their rights and obliga-
tions in a language they can understand”. This information should include informa-
tion on complaint mechanisms (i.e., “the address of the authorities competent to
receive complaints,” rule 24 Havana Rules) and legal assistance. Information should
be provided “in a manner enabling full comprehension” (rule 24 Havana Rules), and
institutions should help children “to understand the regulations governing the inter-
nal organization of the facility, the goals and methodology of the care provided, the
disciplinary requirements and procedures, other authorized methods of seeking
information and of making complaints and all such other matters as are necessary
to enable them to understand fully their rights and obligation during detention” (rule
25 Havana Rules). In other words, information should be “child-friendly”,12 and
information is an essential element of the legal status of children deprived of their
liberty. International standards are very clear on the significance of information, on
the types of information, and on the duties of institutions not only to provide
information but also to make sure that children are capable of understanding it.
Although it is understandable that an institution develops standardized information
for all children, it needs to pay attention to the level of comprehension of individual
children and recognize and subsequently address difficulties children may experi-
ence in understanding information. It is recommendable to incorporate the right to
information and its specific implications for institutions in domestic legislation (see
further Rap and Liefaard 2017 who provide examples of such legislation).
In addition to the child, the child’s parents, guardians, or family should receive
information. First of all, they should be informed about the deprivation of liberty as
such. Second, they should be kept informed about the well-being and whereabouts of
their child (see Art. 9 (4) CRC, rule 56 Havana Rules in case of illness, injury, or
death of a child). This also includes information in case a child is transferred.
12See further the Council of Europe’s Guidelines on child-friendly justice, in particular “Section IV.
Child-friendly justice before, during and after judicial proceedings”; see further Liefaard et al. 2016;
Rap and Liefaard 2017
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Another relevant safeguard concerns the child’s file (see rule 19 Havana Rules).
Each child deprived of liberty should have a personal file which includes records
regarding admission, transfer, and placement and personal, legal, and medical
matters. A file should be regularly updated and reviewed, and a child should have
the right to challenge the content of the file. This right is significant, since the file
serves as an important source of information not only for the institution but also for
the child himself. This is also relevant in relation to the application of disciplinary
measures. A child’s file should record decisions regarding limitations of rights,
including disciplinary measures, and serves as an important source in case the use
of disciplinary measures is being challenged or investigated. In this regard, it is
important that domestic legislation regulates who can have access to files, apart from
child himself and his parents or other representatives, in a manner that respects the
child’s evolving capacities. One could, for example, think of inspection and moni-
toring bodies, complaint committees, and judicial authorities.
Limitations of Rights: Restraint, Force, Screening, and Disciplinary Measures
As mentioned earlier, international children’s rights law allows for limitations in the
enjoyment of rights if this can be justified, in individual cases, in light of the
objectives of the deprivation of liberty and provided that the best interests of the
child are a primary consideration and that the right to be heard is respected. It
therefore is not surprising that international standards do not prohibit the use of
restraint, force, screenings methods, or disciplinary measures, for example, as means
to maintain or restore order and safety in the institution and/or to protect children and
staff. However, international and regional standards are clear in their claim that the
use of restraint, force, screening mechanisms, and disciplinary measures should be
limited to exceptional cases only (see, e.g., rule 63 in conjunction with 64 Havana
Rules). According to the Havana Rules, “[a]ny disciplinary measures and procedures
should be consistent with the upholding of the inherent dignity of the juvenile and
the fundamental objective of institutional care, namely, instilling a sense of justice,
self-respect and respect for the basic rights of every person” (rule 66). The Havana
Rules are also clear that disciplinary measures that constitute cruel, inhuman, or
degrading treatment must be prohibited. This includes “corporal punishment, place-
ment in a dark cell, closed or solitary confinement or any other punishment that may
compromise the physical and mental health of the juvenile concerned” (rule 67
Havana Rules; CRC Committee 2007b, para. 89). International standards provide
more detailed guidance. Family contact should never be limited for any disciplinary
purposes; labor should not be used for disciplinary reasons, and collective sanctions
should be prohibited.
This approach, which finds support in other international standards and legally
binding provisions such as Art. 37 (a) CRC (see also CRC Committee 2007a and
2011), implies that states parties must strictly regulate the use of limitation of rights
in domestic legislation. Such legislation should include the prohibitions mentioned
above and also provide the grounds for the use of limitations, describe the kind of
conduct that could justify a limitation, and stipulate which legal safeguards are
available to the child when he is confronted with limitations. These safeguards
20 T. Liefaard
include the right to an effective remedy, to information and duties for institution to
register the use of limitations, to involve medical practitioners, and to report to
external authorities, such as an inspectorate or other monitoring mechanisms (see
rule 68ff Havana Rules and rule 72ff Havana Rules; see also rule 90.1ff, 93.1ff,
94.1ff, and 125ff European Rules for juvenile offenders). At the European level, the
European Rules for juvenile offenders as well as the CPT standards elaborate quite
extensively on the maintenance of good order in institution and draw states’ attention
to the prohibition of weapons and certain restraints (e.g., chains and irons) and the
importance of using isolation, separation, and segregation with the utmost reticence
(rules 88.1ff European rules). These instruments also underscore the significance of
the role of staff members in avoiding the use of limitations, which can count on the
support of the CRC Committee (CRC Committee 2007b, para. 89) and academic
research (see, e.g., Liefaard et al. 2014).
Special Focus: Solitary Confinement
Solitary confinement is an issue that raises serious concerns and requires special
attention. It is widely practiced in many different forms, and many different terms are
used to point more or less at the same phenomenon, that is, a placement of an
individual child, which keeps him in isolation from the other children within an
institution and which excludes him from taking part in daily activities and having
contact with the outside world (cf. rule 44 Nelson Mandela Rules). In general, its
impact can be detrimental for the child’s health and well-being and its usage on
strained terms with international human rights (see below). Solitary confinement is
used for a variety of reasons; it can be used for disciplinary purposes, to secure the
protection of the juveniles, to control internal order, and for external security
purposes (i.e., to prevent escape, Kilkelly 2012). The isolation of a child may be
framed as solitary confinement, but also as segregation or separation. Although there
is an increasing international trend promoting the abolition of solitary confinement
of children, the international and regional European legal frameworks leave room for
the isolation of children other than disciplinary reasons.
International Legal Framework
The Havana Rules (rule 67), the UN Standard Minimum Rules for the treatment of
prisoners (Nelson Mandela Rules, rule 45(2)), and the European Rules for juvenile
offenders (rule 95.3) are clear in ruling out the use of solitary confinement for
disciplinary purposes. The CRC Committee also stated in General Comment No.
10 that disciplinary measures in violation of Article 37 CRC, including “closed or
solitary confinement,”must be strictly forbidden (CRC Committee 2007b, para. 89).
The CPT has taken a different and more pragmatic approach by stating that “solitary
confinement as a disciplinary measure should only be imposed for very short periods
and under no circumstances for more than three days” (CPT Standards, para. 128). It
adds that a child in solitary confinement must be provided with “socio-educational
support and appropriate human contact” (Ibid.) and that he must be visited regularly
(“at least once a day” (Ibid.) by health-care staff and be offered prompt medical
assistance and treatment. Reports of recent visits indicate that the CPT might have
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altered its course, since it recommended states to abolish solitary confinement on
juveniles as a disciplinary sanction (CPT 2017a, b, c, d). The CPT standards,
however, do not (yet) reflect this change of course.
Solitary confinement may violate Article 3 ECHR. The ECtHR has not (yet)
developed case law specifically regarding the isolation of children deprived of their
liberty. In cases with regard to adults, the ECtHR has found that complete sensory
isolation coupled with total social isolation can destroy the personality and consti-
tutes a form of inhuman treatment that cannot be justified by the requirements of
security or any other reasons (Ocalan v. Turkey (no. 2) (2014), para. 107). At the
same time, the ECtHR held that the prohibition of contact with other prisoners for
security, disciplinary, or protective reasons does not in itself amount to inhuman
treatment or punishment (Ocalan v. Turkey (no. 2) (2014), para. 107), leaving
ostensibly much room for the imposition of solitary confinement. The boundaries
that the ECtHR has set so far to limit the use of solitary confinement set a high
standard for solitary confinement to become in violation of Article 3 ECHR.13 It can
be argued that with regard to children, an even higher standard should be applied
(Liefaard 2008).
In many countries, solitary confinement is not only imposed as a disciplinary
measure but also used as a protective measure (UN Human Rights Council 2015,
para. 44). The European Rules allow in exceptional cases isolation in a calming
down cell for a few hours (rule 91.4), separation from the others for security and
safety reasons (rule 93.1), and segregation for disciplinary purposes where other
sanctions would not be effective (rule 95.4). The CPT standards also refer to
“solitary confinement for protection or preventive purposes” and to the use of a
“calming-down room”, which should be used only in “extremely rare case” or cases
that are “highly exceptional” (CPT Standards, para. 129). Thus, the protection of
children may provide a justification for the use of certain measures that result in a
form of isolation from group processes or other children in particular. It can be
argued that states in specific cases are compelled to do so in light of the obligation to
provide a safe institutional climate which includes protection against violence from
other inmates as well as the protection of other inmates against aggression of the
child (i.e., the horizontal effect of the prohibition of torture and ill-treatment,
Liefaard 2008, p. 602). An individual treatment program may also require an
approach that in a way isolates a child from others. Having said this, the dividing
13The ECtHR made clear that years in strict isolation, combined with poor prison conditions such as
an unheated cell and deprivation of food, amounts to torture and inhuman and degrading treatment
(Ilascu and Others v. Moldova and Russia 2004). Piechowicz v. Poland and Horych v. Poland
(2012) concerned the detention under a strict regime, with restrictions on visits, without sufficient
mental and physical stimulation and without examining if there were concrete reasons for the
prolonged application of that regime. This regime, which continued for several years, was also
considered in breach of Article 3 ECHR by the ECtHR. The ECtHR does not require the absolute
isolation of a prisoner for a situation to become in breach of Article 3 ECHR. A lack of
communication facilities and difficulties for visitors to gain access to the prison may be enough
to amount to a social isolation in violation of Article 3 ECHR (Ocalan v. Turkey (no. 2) 2014).
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line between legally sanctioned used of isolation and unlawful treatment is rather
thin (see, e.g., UN Human Rights Council 2012, 2015). It therefore remains critical
to limit the use of isolation to the maximum extent possible. International standards
are very clear on the obligation to prevent harmful isolation and to provide adequate
assistance and safeguards, including duties to report to medical staff and inspection
mechanisms, and to provide effective remedies.
Towards an Absolute Ban of Solitary Confinement?
The UN Special Rapporteur on Torture holds the view that the imposition of solitary
confinement, of any duration, on juveniles is cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment
and violates Article 7 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and
Article 16 of the Convention against Torture (UN Human Rights Council 2011, para.
77, 2015, para. 44). He recommends states to prohibit solitary confinement of any
duration and for any purpose (UN Human Rights Council 2015, para. 86(d)). The
Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR) supports this recommen-
dation. Pursuant to a 2013 hearing on solitary confinement at the IACHR (C. Soohoo
in Sarat 2017, p. 24), it observed that the Special Rapporteur had presented very
disturbing information about how solitary confinement is applied to children in
different countries to “soften them up”, “protect” them, or provide “corrective
discipline” and urged states to absolutely prohibit the placement of children in
solitary confinement (IACHR 2013). The CRC Committee also supports the ban
on solitary confinement in light of the right of every child to be protected against all
forms of violence (CRC Committee 2011).
This international agenda reflects a movement toward the abolition of solitary
confinement of children. It should be welcomed if one considers the negative health
effects of confinement for children (Lutz et al. 2017, p. 167). It has been established
that these effects can occur already after a few days in solitary confinement and rise
with each additional day spent in such conditions. Research shows that solitary
confinement appears to cause “psychotic disturbances.” Symptoms can include
anxiety, depression, anger, cognitive disturbances, perceptual distortions, paranoia
and psychosis, and self-harm (UN Human Rights Council 2011, para. 62). While the
acute effects of solitary confinement generally recede after the period of solitary
confinement ends, some of the negative health effects are long term. The minimal
stimulation experienced during solitary confinement can lead to a decline in brain
activity in individuals after seven days. One study found that “up to seven days, the
decline is reversible, but if deprived over a long period this may not be the case” (UN
Human Rights Council 2011, para. 64). Additionally, lasting personality changes
often leave individuals formerly held in solitary confinement socially impoverished
and withdrawn, subtly angry, and fearful when forced into social interaction. Intol-
erance of social interaction after a period of solitary confinement is a handicap that
often prevents individuals from successfully readjusting to life within the broader
prison population and severely impairs their capacity to reintegrate into society when
released from imprisonment (Ibid, para. 65). Apart from the evidence showing the
damaging impact of solitary confinement, one should wonder what the use of these
measures means for the child’s sense of fairness and justice. Solitary confinement
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can easily be used as a form of repression and abuse of power and as a way to avoid
normal communication between staff and children. If that is the case, the institution
runs the risk of contributing to or upholding a climate in which children are treated
disrespectfully in which violence among children and between staff and children
occurs (and can continue to occur) with long-lasting impact on the well-being, the
development, and the reintegration of the children (see further Liefaard et al. 2014).
A total ban on solitary confinement may, however, tie the hands of the authorities
responsible for ensuring the order of prison institution and safety of the children. An
absolute ban may therefore even be counterintuitive to the protection of children. It is
not unthinkable that there are scenarios in which solitary confinement or whatever it
is called may be necessary for security or protection reasons. In such situations,
international law does allow for it, but under the full implementation of the principle
that the best interests of the child are a primary consideration (Art. 3 CRC). This
requires a transparent decision-making process, during which the child is consulted
(Liefaard 2008, p. 595). It also requires that the child has the right to remedy the
decision, that the institution informs the child’s parents, guardians, or closest rela-
tives of the placement in solitary confinement. Another important element for the
special protection of children deprived of their liberty is that their treatment be
independently supervised or inspected (Liefaard 2008, p. 606). This relates to the
next element of the special protection rights of child deprived of his liberty.
D. Inspections and Monitoring
Robust inspection and independent monitoring of places of detention is essential to
ensure the accountability and the effective protection of the rights of children
deprived of their liberty (Kilkelly 2012, p. 24). Hence, the Havana Rules and its
international and regional equivalents underscore the significance of such inspection
and monitoring mechanisms (see, e.g., rules 83–85 Nelson Mandela Rules). The
Havana Rules stipulate that “[q]ualified inspectors or an equivalent duly constituted
authority not belonging to the administration of the facility should be empowered to
conduct inspections on a regular basis” (rule 72 Havana Rules). Such authorities
should also be competent to conduct unannounced inspections, and they “should
enjoy full guarantees of independence in the exercise of this function” (rule 72
Havana Rules). The competency of inspection and monitoring bodies should include
the inspection of every aspect or condition of “institutional life that affect the
physical and mental health of juveniles” (rule 73 Havana Rules) and the duty to
report on the findings (rule 74 Havana Rules). Children should also have the right to
talk in confidence to inspecting or monitoring officers. This is linked to the right to
make requests and file complaints (see, e.g., rule 76 and 77 Havana Rules; see further
para. 5).
International instruments provide little guidance on how the independent inspec-
tion and monitoring mechanisms should be positioned (e.g., at the national level or
closer to institutions), but for their effectiveness, proximity seems relevant (Liefaard
2008). This enables inspectors to visit institutions on a regular basis and ensure that
they understand the specific context in which the institution operates. A local
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inspection mechanism could contribute to more community involvement. At the
same time, a certain distance to the institution administration is important, in order to
secure the mechanism’s independence and objectivity. Inspection and monitoring
mechanisms should also be able to connect with the government, for example, in
case of structural problems or serious rights violations, which cannot be solved in the
local level. Furthermore, it is important to point at the existence of international
monitoring mechanisms, such as the CPT and Subcommittee on Prevention of
Torture (under the Optional Protocol to the CAT; SPT), and the importance of
cooperation between national and international mechanisms (see, e.g., rule 126.4
European rules for juvenile offenders). States that are party to OPCATmust establish
a National Preventive Mechanism which aims to serve as an independent external
monitoring body and can liaise between domestic monitoring and the work of the
SPT (Art. 3 OPCAT; see further Van Keirsbilck et al. 2016, p. 43).
The same is true for additional national mechanisms that may play a role in the
monitoring of institutions, including national human rights institutions, children’s
ombudspersons or commissioners, or the judiciary. Finally, it is important to high-
light that the establishment of independent monitoring bodies does not exempt the
state from the responsibility to inspect institution on a regular basis and assess if
these are operating in accordance with national and international law (see rule 125
European Rules).
E. Separation Issues
One final issue that can be regarded as part of a child’s special protection rights
concerns the separation of different categories of children. Article 37 (c) CRC’s
requirement that children must be separated from adults, unless it is not in their best
interests to do so, should primarily be seen as a requirement to protect the child
against the negative influences of adults.14 This seems straightforward, but there are
some practical implications requiring specific attention. First, what does separation
mean? Rule 13.4 Beijing Rules provides that children in pretrial detention should be
separated from adults and be housed in a separate institution “or in a separate part of
an institution also holding adults”. Similar provisions can be found in rule 26.3
Beijing Rules on children in institutions. Although this leaves room for placement of
children in facilities where adults are accommodated as well, the CRC Committee
took a firmer stand point by providing that “[s]tates parties should establish separate
facilities for children deprived of liberty, which include distinct, child-centred staff,
personnel, policies and practices” (CRC Committee 2007b, para. 85). This position
is based on rule 29 of the Havana Rules, which provides that “[i]n all detention
facilities [children] should be separated from adults, unless they are members of the
same family”. The Havana Rules do allow for one exception. “Under controlled
conditions, [children] may be brought together with carefully selected adults as part
14Although it also aims to safeguard child-specific treatment requiring child-specific facilities with
specialized staff, among others, Liefaard 2008, p. 259ff
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of a special programme that has been shown to be beneficial for the [children]
concerned” (Havana Rules Rule 29). This relates the best interests of the child
clause of Art. 37 (c) CRC, which “should be interpreted narrowly” and “does not
mean for the convenience of the States Parties” (CRC Committee 2007b, para. 85;
see also Schabas and Sax 2006, p. 92). One could think of situations in which the
facilities for children are inadequate or detention in a separate facility would imply
complete isolation (Van Bueren 1995, p. 222).
A related question concerns the position of children who turn eighteen, while being
deprived of their liberty, and are technically no longer a child under Art. 1 of the CRC.
Should they be transferred immediately to an adult facility? The CRC Committee
argues that “[t]his rule does not mean that a child placed in a facility for children has to
be moved to a facility for adults immediately after he/she turns eighteen” and that “[c]
ontinuation of his/her stay in the facility for children should be possible if that is in her/
his best interests and not contrary to the best interests of the younger children in the
facility” (CRC Committee 2007b, para. 86).15 This position fits in the increased
attention for the position of young adults in the criminal justice system and related
systems, such as the child protection system. For example, the European Rules for
juvenile offenders provide that “[j]uveniles who reach the age of majority and young
adults dealt with as if they were juveniles shall normally be held in institutions for
juvenile offenders or in specialised institutions for young adults, unless their social
reintegration can be better effected in an institution for adults” (rule 59.3). Outside the
context of juvenile justice, there is hardly any guidance regarding children in transition
from minority into majority. In the Netherlands, courts have taken the position that
when a minor reaches the age of majority, he can in principle no longer be kept
deprived of their liberty as a form of alternative. Article 5 (1)(d) ECHR does not allow
for detention of others than minors for the purpose of educational supervision (The
Hague Court of Appeal, 26 March 2009, ECLI:NL:GHSGR:2009:BH0778, paras. 4.3
and 4.4). At the same time, it can be argued that a certain transitional phase should be
provided, among others, to avoid that these young adults do not receive aftercare and
support in their reintegration (Liefaard and Bruning 2017).
Reintegration Rights
The third and final component of the legal status of children deprived of their liberty
concerns their reintegration. Its relevance lies in the notion that deprivation of liberty
should always be limited in time and that children have the right to play a constructive
role in the society (see, e.g., Art. 40 (1) CRC). As a consequence, reintegration has to
be at the core of the approach toward children deprived of their liberty, and this affects
children’s rights. The negative impact of deprivation of liberty should be minimized,
15See further Liefaard 2008, p. 263. In the context of juvenile justice, it can be argued that a child
who turns 18, while he finds himself in an institution as part of an intervention (pretrial or post-
conviction) for a crime committed before he turned 18, remains entitled to be treated under the
protection of the CRC. The CRC Committee has not yet clarified its position in this regard.
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and the child should be provided with opportunities (to continue) to develop and to
prepare for an independent and constructive role in the society. Among others, this
underscores the need for alternatives for closed institutions and activities relevant for
reintegration during (and after) the deprivation of liberty. This is why the Havana
Rules recommend the use of small-scale and open detention facilities (rule 30 Havana
Rules) and to establish strong links between the institution and (services from) the
community (see also CRC Committee 2007b, para. 89). It also explains why interna-
tional standards focus so heavily on providing basic services including adequate and
child-friendly accommodation, education and vocational training, and health care and
individualized treatment programs (see also CRC Committee 2007b, para. 89; see also
Blokhin v. Russia [GC] (2016), para. 170). These programs should be tailored to the
individual child on the basis of a careful assessment, made as soon as possible after
admission and subjected to periodic review (rule 27 and 28 Havana Rules; see also
Art. 25 CRC; see also CPT standards, para. 109). The JDLs are also clear on the need
for “arrangements” assisting children in returning to society, education, employment,
and family life after release (rule 79 Havana Rules). Furthermore, the accommodation
of the child has potential impact on his reintegration. In light of the heterogeneity of
the group of children and the interests of individual children, institutions should
differentiate between children. As mentioned earlier, rule 28 Havana Rules provides
that “[t]he detention of [children] should only take place under conditions that take full
account of their particular needs, status and special requirements according to their
age, personality, sex and type of offence, as well as mental and physical health, and
which ensure their protection from harmful influences and risk situations.” In addition,
“[t]he principal criterion for the separation of different categories of [children]
deprived of their liberty should be the provision of the type of care best suited to the
particular needs of the individuals concerned and the protection of their physical,
mental and moral integrity and well-being” (rule 28 Havana Rules).
A related question is whether girls should be separated from boys. Apart from rule
28 Havana Rules, children’s rights instruments are rather silent on this matter. Rule
26.4 of the Beijing Rules does recognize, however, that girls “deserve special
attention as to their personal needs and problems” and that “they shall by no
means receive less care, protection, assistance, treatment and training than [boys]”.
This position has been endorsed by the CPT using the same wording and adding that
this requirement applies “despite the fact that their numbers are much lower and that
detention centres are nearly always designed for male inmates” (CPT 2015, 1 para.
111). These provisions correspond with the prohibition of discrimination according
to gender (Art. 2 CRC, rule 4 Havana Rules) and fit in the global recognition of the
significance of gender differentiation, which resulted in general standards referring
to the significance of differentiation.16
16See, e.g. 2015 Nelson Mandela Rules advocating for separation as far as possible and the CPT
standards addressing “women deprived of their liberty” as a separate category requiring separate
accommodations, CPT 2000
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Again, the right to maintain contact with the family is of importance. Not only
because the child can benefit from contact and support during his stay in the
institution and subsequent reintegration program but also because many children
reintegrate into their (extended) family. In light of this right, the location of the
institution matters. International legal standards provide that a child should in
principle be placed in a decentralized institution, e.g., in the vicinity of the child’s
family, which essentially supports the view that states should have smaller facilities
within the community rather than large-scale institutions far away from family and
relatives (rule 30 Havana Rules).
Since the child’s placement matters for his reintegration, the child could benefit
from the possibility to challenge his placement or request another placement if that
particular placement better serves his needs and interests (in terms of treatment,
contact with family, leave arrangements, etc.). This can be regarded as an element of
the right to access to justice, but international standards do not provide specific
guidance on this matter.17
Finally, it should be noted that the reintegration of children is not served by a
disrespect for the child’s humanity and inherent dignity. This first relates to the
protection against ill-treatment and violence (in its many forms). It also relates to
how children deprived of their liberty are perceived and portrayed in the society and
to the attitude and examples set by professionals working in or around the institution.
The CRC Committee rightfully observed the following: “If the key actors in juvenile
justice, such as police officers, prosecutors, judges and probation officers, do not
fully respect and protect [children’s human rights and freedoms – TL], how can they
expect that with such poor examples the child will respect the human rights and
fundamental freedom of others?” (CRC Committee 2007b, para. 13).
5 Special Issue: Access to Justice18
5.1 Right to an Effective Remedy and Access to Justice
An essential element of children’s legal status when deprived of their liberty is the
right to an effective remedy, which forms part of the broader concept of access to
justice, a cornerstone of human rights law (Shelton 2015). Prompt access to remedies
is seminal to redress rights violations and secure protection against violence and ill-
treatment, to enable investigations into the wrongdoing and the punishment of those
responsible, and to ensure that children can benefit from adequate treatment, reinte-
gration, and restorative measures. Judicial and other remedies can, in other words,
17Dutch law for children deprived of liberty in youth custodial institutions explicitly provides that
they have the right to request an alternative placement or lodge a complaint against certain
placement before the competent authority; see Liefaard 2008, p. 541ff
18This part has been based on one of the author’s previous publications, Liefaard 2017
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safeguard the enjoyment of children’s human rights (Liefaard 2017, p. 62). Children
should therefore have opportunities to access justice and challenge unlawful or
arbitrary treatment. In addition, they should, in case of human rights violation,
receive appropriate reparation, including compensation, and, where needed, mea-
sures, to promote physical and psychological recovery, rehabilitation, and reintegra-
tion (Art. 39 CRC, CRC Committee 2003b, para. 24).
Remedies must be effective, which concerns the competence of the relevant
authorities to take decisions on the merits of the complaints and to provide adequate
redress for any violation found (De Schutter 2010, p. 737). The state is subsequently
held to make reparations (Human Rights Committee 2004, para. 16). It also
enshrines that perpetrators of rights violations are brought to justice and held to
account (Ibid.). In all, without an effective remedy, human rights would be toothless
(CRC Committee 2003b, para. 24; UN Human Rights Council 2013).
5.2 International Standards for Children Deprived of Liberty:
Right to Make Requests and File Complaints
The Havana Rules provide that “every juvenile should have the right to make a
request or complaint, without censorship as to substance, to the central administra-
tion, the judicial authority or other proper authorities through approved channels,
and to be informed of the response without delay” (rule 76, emphasis added). They
furthermore stipulate that “[e]fforts should be made to establish an independent
office (ombudsman) to receive and investigate complaints made by juveniles
deprived of their liberty and to assist in the achievement of equitable settlements”
(rule 77). The provisions in the Havana Rules correspond with provisions in general
international and regional instruments concerning the treatment of prisoners, which
more or less provide the same minimum requirements (see, e.g., rule 56 (3) Nelson
Mandela Rules).
5.3 The Functions of Complaint Mechanisms
Remedies can be sought through a variety of judicial and non-judicial mechanisms.
The choice for a suitable complaint mechanism is – among others – related to the
different functions complaint mechanisms can have. One could distinguish four
functions (Liefaard 2012):
1. Remedy against unlawful or arbitrary treatment by the institution
First, complaint mechanisms offer a remedy against unlawful or arbitrary treat-
ment by the institution (Liefaard 2017, p. 69). This function offers protection
against rights violations. It aims to facilitate investigation, accountability, com-
pensation, reparation, and restoration. The available mechanisms should enshrine
ways to formally question the treatment of the child before the director of
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institution, but also before the overarching competent authorities outside the
institution, such as the central prison administration. Children should additionally
be granted opportunities to lodge a formal complaint outside the institution before
an independent and impartial authority.
2. Dispute settlement
Complaints lodged by children deprived of their liberty may very well be about
disputes or disagreements, which affect the well-being of children (de Graaf et al.
2016). In this regard complaint mechanisms can serve as a means to settle
disputes or mediate between the child and the institution. One could argue that
the settlement of disputes is a matter for the institution, and there may be no need
to safeguard access to mechanisms outside. However, as indicated by the Havana
Rules in rule 77, there is reason to provide that children should have access to an
independent office/ombudsman competent to receive and investigate complaints
and to assist in the achievement of equitable settlements. This could concern
complaints regarding the way the institution responded to a grievance of the child.
In addition, mediation could also be used as part of the procedure concerning
rights violations or arbitrary treatment (Liefaard 2017, p. 70).
3. Safeguarding communication between child and institution – right to be heard
The possibilities to lodge complaints and make requests, for example, concerning
leave, revolve around safeguarding communication between the child and insti-
tution. Every child has the right to be heard, and his views must be given due
weight in accordance with his age and maturity (Art. 12 CRC). This has impli-
cations for all decisions affecting children, including, for example, the use of
disciplinary measures. Complaint mechanisms can safeguard that children’s view
are indeed taken into consideration. Communication between a child and the
institution can assist in preventing the use of complaint mechanisms. The estab-
lishment of youth boards, through which there is regular communication between
children and the institution administration, could also be helpful in this regard
(Liefaard 2017, p. 71).
4. Increasing transparency and visibility of the child
Complaint procedures can moreover make institutions more transparent and
children more visible. They can facilitate the exchange of information regarding
the treatment of children and give reason for further investigation into specific
policies and/or practices. For transparency, one needs mechanisms positioned
outside the institution. As mentioned earlier, international standards provide that
states should set up independent inspection and monitoring mechanisms. These
can play an important role in bridging issues that arise between institution
administration and the child (Van Zyl Smit and Snacken 2009, p. 306 with
reference to CPT 2nd General Report (CPT 1992, para. 54)). Moreover, they
can make remedies accessible for children, pave the way to speedy dispute
settlements and mediation, and assist children to find their way to formal pro-
ceedings (Liefaard 2017, p. 72).
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5.4 Challenges for Children Deprived of Their Liberty to Access
Justice: Legal Empowerment
Apart from the general barriers children face when seeking effective remedies,19
children deprived of their liberty have particular problems with accessing informa-
tion, receiving legal and other appropriate assistance, and accessing mechanisms in
the institution’s vicinity that offer, among others, accessible, age-appropriate, safe,
speedy, and sustainable remedies (UN General Assembly 2006). The substantiation
of claims concerning ill-treatment is often hard to make for children deprived of
liberty (Murdoch 2006, p. 32). Furthermore, children deprived of liberty form a
stigmatized group, which contributes to the denial of their human rights, including
their right to access to justice (Liefaard 2017, p. 65).
In light to these challenges, legal empowerment of children deprived of liberty is
key and relates to (1) information, (2) legal and other appropriate assistance, and (3)
the availability of child-friendly or child-sensitive proceedings. These three elements
will be highlighted briefly (see further Liefaard 2017):
1. Information
The CRC Committee underscores the importance of children knowing about
mechanisms for complaints and to make requests and to have easy access to
these mechanisms (CRC Committee 2009, para. 89. See also Penal Reform
International 2013, p. 3). This starts with adequate information on the right to
complaint, the addresses of the authority competent to receiving complaints and
of agencies or organizations that can provide legal assistance, upon admission
(Rule 24 Havana Rules; see also Rule 54 of the Nelson Mandela Rules). In the
context of disciplinary measures, the child should be informed of the alleged
infraction and given proper opportunity to present his defense, including the right
of appeal to an impartial authority (rule 70 Havana Rules).
Information should be child-friendly and give due regard to their “evolving
maturity and understanding when exercising their rights” (UN Human Rights Coun-
cil 2013, para. 5). The guidelines on child-friendly justice, developed by the Council
19Barriers generally relate to the complexity of justice systems and the fact that children may be
unaware of their rights; justice mechanisms may not be child-specific or child-friendly, discrimi-
natory toward children, unsafe for children, intimidating, or stigmatizing (UN Human Rights
Council 2013, para. 15), and cultural and social norms can stand in the way of accepting that
children lodge complaints and claim redress or in recognizing that the rights of children are violated
(UN Human Rights Council 2013, para. 15; see also UNICEF 2015, p. 80ff.); children often face
legal barriers, such as the lack of legal capacity to access to justice and ability to seek remedies, and
practical barriers, such as costs of proceedings, lack of free legal assistance, or physical distance to
courts or other authorities (UN Human Rights Council 2013, para. 16)
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of Europe, could be of further assistance since they elaborate on the information and
advice for children before, during, and after judicial proceedings.20
2. Legal and other appropriate assistance
The right to legal and other appropriate assistance of children deprived of their
liberty is considered another prerequisite for effective access to remedies while
being institutionalized (Art. 37 (d) CRC). Legal assistance is directly relevant for
the legal empowerment of children, not only in relation to the legality of the
deprivation of liberty as such but also to the right to an effective remedy during
the deprivation of liberty. Other assistance can among others be provided by
family members or humanitarian groups (rule 77 Havana Rules).
3. Child-friendly procedures: effective participation, speediness, confidentiality,
and safety
Complaint procedures should be child-friendly or child-sensitive,21 speedy,22
confidential,23 and safe.24 In addition, the authorities competent to receive com-
plaints should be specialized and capable of communicating with children in
order to enable children to participate effectively in the procedures. This also
requires that children can exercise their right to be heard and are entitled to
receive a duly reasoned decision, which he can understand.25 The European
rules for juvenile offenders provide that “[p]rocedures for making requests or
complaints shall be simple and effective” (rule 122.1), which supports speedy and
informal procedures over lengthy and formal ones. However, the matter
concerned and the function of the remedy may call for careful examination by a
higher authority that can issue decisions that are legally binding for the institution
and/or the state.
20Among others, the guidelines include recommendations to guarantee information on “existing
mechanisms for review of decisions affecting the child” and to “obtain reparation from the offender
or from the state through the justice process, alternative civil proceedings or through other
processes” (Guidelines on child-friendly justice, under IV.A.1.1.i and IV.A.1.1.j, resp.).
21See UN Human Rights Council 2013, para. 21ff
22(See rule 76 Havana Rules and the European rules for juvenile offenders; see also Guidelines on
child-friendly justice, under IV.D.4.50; rule 57 of the Nelson Mandela Rules gives further guidance
and provides a possibility to approach a judicial or other authority in case of rejection of the
complaint or in the event of undue delay
23Confidentiality is considered crucial, particularly in case of allegations of serious forms of ill-
treatment (Murdoch and Jiricka 2015, pp. 73–74), but also in light of particular dependency and
vulnerability of children and the risk of retaliation, intimidation, or other negative consequences of
having submitted a request or complaint (see rule 57 Nelson Mandela Rules)
24Children deprived of their liberty should be able to lodge a complaint “without censorship as to
substance” (rule 76 Havana Rules)
25See, e.g. Guidelines on child-friendly justice, under IV.D.2.44; see also CRC Committee 2009
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6 Some Concluding Remarks
International children’s rights law is utterly clear. The use of deprivation of liberty of
children must be limited to the absolute minimum, and if it is regarded necessary,
arrest, detain, imprison, or institutionalize a child, states have the obligation to
safeguard that her or his rights are recognized and adequately protected. This chapter
has elaborated on the specifics of the two limbs of Article 37 CRC, which is the core
human rights provision for protection of children deprived of liberty and builds on
similar provisions in international and regional general human rights treaties. The
CRC clearly adds a child-specific and children’s rights dimension that comes with
specific obligations for states parties. International and regional children’s rights
instruments provide detailed guidance on how these norms should be incorporated
and implemented in the domestic legal systems. International standards are detailed
and strong on substantive norms, but less clear on procedural matters. They seem to
lean more toward providing services and less on empowering children, including the
right to remedy unlawful or arbitrary treatment effectively. This may ultimately
mean that children are inadequately protected against ill-treatment and other forms
of violence, which is worrisome, in light of the realities that millions of children
deprived of their liberty face, across the globe.
Consequently, it remains key to prevent deprivation of liberty as much as
possible. The stakes are high – children deprived of liberty find themselves in a
delicate situation, which makes them particularly vulnerable and at risk of seeing
their future perspectives wasted away. One may prefer complete abolition (see, e.g.,
Goldson and Kilkelly 2013), which can certainly be supported in the context of
immigration, among others. In other contexts, however, such as juvenile justice,
mental health, and child protection, it is realistic to assume that there will always be
children deprived of their liberty and that these children’s short- and long-term
interests are used to justify this. This does by no means exempt states parties from
the clear obligation to prevent the use of deprivation of liberty and to reduce its
impact on children as much as possible, calling for short-term stays in child-friendly,
open institutions, with no or minimal security measures and that actively engage
with community actors, among others, families, schools, health services, and ser-
vices offering recreational and cultural activities, sports, etc. In addition, the visibil-
ity of children inside the institutions is key. This calls, among others, for more
attention for children’s right to access justice and for available and accessible,
independent monitoring mechanisms. It is highly recommended that the upcoming
UN Global Study on Deprivation of Liberty of Children pays specific attention to
access to justice mechanisms and identifies good practices of countries in which such
mechanisms have been established and operationalized, supported by a sustainable
basis in law. The presentation of such good practices should include information on
how means to access justice can function effectively in practice, also in light of the
particular challenges children face in the context of deprivation of liberty.
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